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Abstract
In the past decade, corporate targets of American investigative reporting have deployed
new legal and public relations counter-attacks on journalists. Although corporations have largely
directed their efforts at managing subsequent news coverage of these controversies, there has
been no systematic study of how the rest of the media cover them. We examine elite print
reaction to two investigative reports that were publicly challenged by their targets: ABC’s 1992
Primetime Live report on Food Lion supermarkets and NBC’s 1992 Dateline NBC story on
General Motors’ trucks. The case studies and content analyses of print coverage of these
controversies suggest that greater attention should be paid to how media response to
investigative reporting can influence its ability to act as a watchdog on corporate power. In both
cases, corporate targets of investigative reporting used litigation and public relations to divert
media attention from reporters’ charges to questions of newsgathering ethics. Ironically, we find
that the more that news organizations under attack defend their right to muckrake, the more they
risk the rest of the news media burying the disputed story under discussion of First Amendment
rights and media ethics. The study draws conclusions for theories of investigative reporting’s
contribution to public discourse and policy making.
Keywords
Investigative reporting, journalism, politics, corporations

In the past decade, corporate targets of American investigative reporting have responded
with more intense and innovative counter-attacks on their journalistic critics. Corporations have
supplemented traditional libel lawsuits with product disparagement litigation and a variety of
novel tort suits alleging harms from the newsgathering process, including fraud, trespass, breach
of duty, tortious interference with contractual relationships, intrusion, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (Kirtley 1996; Scheim 1998; Bunker et al 1999; Kirtley 2000). In addition,
corporate targets ratcheted up public relations efforts to kill or alter hostile stories before
publication and discredit them after publication (Borjesson 2002). Legal strategy and news
management gave birth to the new field of litigation public relations, involving communication
campaigns directed toward strategic audiences – such as potential jurors, opposing lawyers, and
judges – that aim to influence legal negotiations or trial outcomes (Gibson and Padilla 1999).
Investigative targets’ aggressive defenses of their reputations, combined with increased
profit pressures from corporate parents on news organizations, have been criticized for
contributing to several widely publicized capitulations by news organizations. Tobacco industry
pressure pushed ABC to rescind a 1994 investigative story on manipulation of nicotine levels in
cigarettes and CBS to shelve a 1995 story on tobacco company wrongdoing (Hilts 1996).
Chiquita Brands’ attack on a 1998 Cincinnati Enquirer series that used company voice mails to
indict executives for lawbreaking wrung an apology and retraction from the paper (Shepard
1998). Two journalists sued a Florida Fox news affiliate, alleging that the station sanitized their
criticisms of the health risks posed by a Monsanto growth hormone fed to cows, then fired them
for refusing to accept the editing of their story (Rampton and Stauber 1998).
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Despite the new intensity and sophistication of corporate targets’ responses to
investigative reporting, largely advanced through the news media themselves, there has been no
systematic study of news coverage of these controversies. Yet the rest of the news media
provide an important site for framing these disputes in ways that may influence the impact of
investigative reporting on policy and public opinion. This study begins to fill this gap by
examining elite print reaction to two investigative reports that were publicly challenged by their
targets: ABC’s 1992 Primetime Live report on Food Lion supermarkets and NBC’s 1992
Dateline NBC story on General Motors’ trucks. The study contributes to building theory about
the factors that influence media coverage of investigative reporting controversies. It also sheds
light on the ways that reaction to investigative reporting by its targets and by other news
organizations affects the media’s ability to fulfill its role in democratic theory as a watchdog on
powerful institutions. In particular, we inquire into the extent to which corporate public relations
campaigns and lawsuits can divert media attention from the original allegations made by
investigative reports, potentially inhibiting the media’s ability to contribute to reform and
regulation. These questions are especially urgent in an era when increasing concerns are raised
about the growth of corporate power over politics and speech (Boggs 2000; Soley 2002).

Investigative Reporting and Democratic Theory of News
Investigative reporting is a genre of journalism in which reporters “dig out information
about power abuses” (Waisbord 2000: xix). Although investigative journalists frequently rely on
the investigative work of others, they engage in a longer and more painstaking newsgathering
process than daily beat reporters. This process may involve observations based on concealing
the journalist’s presence or identity, the assembly and analysis of larger bodies of information
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(such as computer-assisted studies of financial records), or arranging tests or “stings” to
demonstrate harm that people or products may cause the public. Investigative journalism takes a
more proactive, analytical and prosecutorial stance than the more descriptive and reactive work
of beat reporting (de Burgh 2000: 21).
As such, investigative reporting is often hailed as the kind of news that makes the greatest
contribution to the media’s role as a watchdog on government and corporate power (Jensen
2000; Serrin and Serrin 2000). Through their exposés, investigative reporters are seen as holding
the mighty accountable to public opinion, thereby acting as a crucial if unofficial check and
balance in the system of constitutional government. This kind of reporting may also be seen as a
moral watchdog that marks and reinforces commonly-shared values by highlighting violations of
them (Ettema and Glasser 1998).
However, many factors can limit investigative reporting’s ability to hold powerful
institutions accountable to the public (Curran 1991; Protess et al 1991). First, media owners may
curb reporters’ independence, especially when investigative reporting poses risks to proprietors’
own business interests. Second, advertisers can mute journalists’ criticisms as well. In a recent
survey, over 40 percent of broadcast investigative reporters admitted that advertisers had recently
succeeded in influencing a news report (Soley 1997). Third, because investigative reporting
costs more to produce than other kinds of news, it is scarce, especially at a time of increasing
economic competition. For example, since the 1970s, the network newsmagazines, which have
long been the main venue for investigative journalism on television, have decreased the
proportion of their stories about politics and economics, turning to more celebrity features and
lifestyle coverage (Committee of Concerned Journalists 1998; Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001).
Fourth, news organizations’ commitment to novelty and fear of appearing to crusade on an issue
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limit journalists’ ability to sustain coverage of any one story, undercutting efforts to maintain the
attention of the public and policymakers to the need for reform. Fifth, the news media’s
dependence on public relations as a source of information can limit the diversity of views in
news and allow powerful institutions that are often the targets of watchdog journalism to
dominate public debate. Greater competition and shrinking news budgets have left journalists
more dependent on public relations than in the 1960s and 1970s (Walters and Walters 1992).
Finally, investigative reporting often sparks libel and other tort suits against news organizations,
exerting pressure to limit its amount and to avoid targets that can afford extensive legal
challenges to reporting (Kirtley 2000).
New kinds of corporate counterattacks on investigative journalism raise concerns about
its ability to play the watchdog role. These case studies can help inform research on the ways in
which media coverage of investigative reporting controversies can act as a counter-force to
corporate power or help raise barriers to doing so.

The Sociology of Investigative Reporting
As Protess and his coauthors have argued, investigative reporters often explain the impact
of their work by drawing on what has been called the “mobilization model” (1991: 12) of
investigative reporting (see Figure 1). According to this highly idealized view, investigative
journalists work independently to uncover wrongdoing. Their stories then mobilize the public to
demand reforms, spurring politicians to pass legislation or take other corrective actions. In this
model, reporters can influence the political process positively yet remain detached from it,
allowing investigative reporters to stay within the pale of professional norms of objectivity
despite taking sides on a public issue.
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FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
Much prior research on investigative reporting calls the mobilization model into question.
Protess and his colleagues found that reporters often do not uncover injustices independently,
instead relying for story ideas and information on enterprising interest groups, bureaucrats and
elected officials advancing their policy agendas through the media (see also Waisbord 2000).
The resulting stories do not always spur changes in public opinion or move the public to act.
Some of these stories may nevertheless contribute to political change by amplifying prior
criticisms of interest groups and officials. When policy changes occur in the absence of public
reaction, they may arise from negotiations between journalists and political actors before the
reports are released, or because policy makers use the reports to justify enacting changes they
previously supported. Thus, investigative reporting’s contribution to reform may be to influence
the thinking of political elites more than the public. Watergate reporting, for example, did not
generate strong public opinion in favor of President Nixon’s impeachment or resignation;
instead, reporting increased and reflected pressure to oust Nixon that came from within the
federal government itself (Lang and Lang 1983; Schudson 1992).
We examine the role played by other variables that may affect investigative reporting’s
impact, which are not included in the mobilization model and have not been studied
systematically in the past. The principal factors are investigative targets’ litigation public
relations and media reaction to disputed reports. We hypothesize that the impact of investigative
reporting on policy and public opinion depends in part on how the rest of the news media react to
investigative journalism and any countercharges it provokes. After all, the news media provide
the main public forum for subsequent discussion of issues raised by investigative reporters. The
media can keep a story alive and build momentum for reform by treating investigative reports as
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credible, repeating their charges, engaging in further investigation of them, and offering space
for likeminded speakers to confirm their analysis of problems and offer policy solutions. In
contrast, the news media can help kill stories and block change through inattention, refutation,
and diversion from the issues raised by investigative journalists. Media coverage is also a policy
resource. Critics and proponents may cite media commentary as a resource for attacking and
defending reports, journalists’ right to muckrake in general, and regulation of the media.
Studying media response also turns attention to actors who attempt to shape it, including targets
of investigative reports, alleged victims featured in the stories and their advocates, and
government regulators of the targeted companies.

Case Studies
General Motors - NBC
In the middle of 1992, General Motors (GM) was defending itself from numerous private
lawsuits against its 1973-1987 C/K pickup trucks, which featured sidesaddle gas tanks mounted
outside the trucks’ frames that were accused of being vulnerable to fires and explosions in sideimpact accidents. The litigation led two consumer advocacy groups – the Center for Auto Safety
and Public Citizen – to convince the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to investigate the allegedly defective design of the tanks. The consumer groups urged a recall of
the trucks.
On November 17, 1992, Dateline NBC aired a story that claimed the GM trucks with
external gas tanks were prone to explode in accidents. The report relied on information from the
Center for Auto Safety and plaintiff attorneys in the lawsuit Moseley v. General Motors, who
alleged that faulty design of the GM gas tanks were responsible for a young man’s death (Hearit
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1996). NBC cited estimates that as many as 300 deaths had been attributed to the fuel tank
design, and that about five million of the vehicles were still on the road. The report presented
what it called an “unscientific” test crash in which a GM truck exploded into flames after being
hit from the side.
GM launched an investigation of NBC’s reporting, finding that producers had rigged the
truck that was shown exploding in the story with incendiary devices after NBC’s preliminary
crash tests did not yield any footage of explosions. On February 8, 1993, GM filed a defamation
lawsuit against NBC News and The Institute For Safety Analysis (TISA), consultants hired by
NBC to administer the crash test. GM announced its suit against NBC in an innovative manner
in a press conference beamed via satellite to media worldwide, making it one of the top stories
on all the major U.S. networks’ evening newscasts. NBC settled the suit the following day,
before the network was even served legal papers, offering GM an on-air apology and agreeing to
pay $2 million for the cost of GM’s investigation, press conference and legal fees. That same
day, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Office of Defect Investigation (ODI)
requested a voluntary recall of GM C/K pickup trucks. Soon after, NBC News President
Michael Gartner stepped down and three Dateline producers involved in the story left NBC,
purportedly because of management pressure to resign over the GM truck story.
The timing and conduct of GM’s litigation public relations effort suggest that it was
intended to distract public and regulatory attention from accusations against the company’s
trucks by focusing a spotlight on NBC’s newsgathering ethics. GM announced the lawsuit one
day after the company lost a $105.2 million verdict in the Moseley case. The morning before
NBC’s report aired, internal GM documents were leaked that suggested company officials were
concerned about the tank design as early as 1978, and that its engineers had warned in 1983 that
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the vehicles would be safer if the tanks were moved inside the truck frame (Oppel, Jr. and
Simnacher 1992). In a follow-up story, NBC reported that over 100 lawsuits had been filed
against GM, most of them settled out of court. One lawyer estimated that the company had paid
around $20 million to settle seven such suits in Texas.
However, after NBC settled the lawsuit, an outside law firm hired by the network to
investigate the test crash concluded that a broken headlamp, not the incendiary devices, ignited
gasoline that spilled from the truck’s tank after the collision punched a hole in the tank and
dislodged its gas cap. The Institute for Safety Analysis, which acted as a consultant to the
report’s producers, claimed that “the fire was caused by one of the car’s headlamps, not by the
igniters,” and the law firm agreed that “to our untrained eyes the videotape does appear to
support the consultants’ reports” (Goodale 1993b: 3). In 1994, the United States Department of
Transportation found that the trucks were indeed prone to fires in side collisions and blamed GM
for 150 deaths caused by them (Shepard 1996). The NHTSA found that the C/K trucks were 2.4
times more likely to explode than Ford pickups and 3.5 times more likely to explode than Dodge
pickups (Adler 1993). GM entered into a settlement with the government, agreeing to spend
$51.36 million on safety and research programs (Nauss 1994). By the end of the year 2000, GM
had paid at least $495 million, an average of $1.5 million per case, to settle lawsuits brought by
victims of fiery C/K pickup truck crashes (San Jose Mercury News 7 May 2003, 4A).
Food Lion - ABC
Also in 1992, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union was engaged in a longrunning campaign to organize employees of the Food Lion supermarket chain. As part of its
effort, the union had filed a 1991 complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, triggering an
investigation of the company’s labor practices as well as Congressional hearings in early 1992
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(Manheim 2001: 74-75). On November 5, 1992, ABC’s PrimeTime Live aired an investigative
report based in part on the union’s claims that Food Lion forced employees to work overtime
without pay and engage in unsafe food handling practices to save money. Former Food Lion
workers spoke of marinating rotten fish in baking soda, repackaging old chicken in barbecue
sauce and removing “sell-by” dates on eggs and yogurt with fingernail polish. The report also
featured footage obtained by cameras hidden in the wigs of two ABC producers who had lied on
their job applications to go undercover as Food Lion employees.
Food Lion brought a barrage of legal claims against ABC and four of its journalists. The
core complaints that survived pre-trial hearings accused ABC journalists of committing fraud on
their job applications, trespassing on company property, and breach of loyalty to Food Lion as
their employer (Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, M.D.N.C. 1995).
The supermarket chain claimed that two producers fraudulently obtained employment by
falsifying documents, including lying on their résumés. In addition, Food Lion argued that the
producers committed trespass when they entered company property under false pretenses. The
supermarket chain also hoped to prove that the producers failed to act solely for Food Lion and
not adversely to its interests. The common law principle of duty of loyalty states that employees
cannot legally have a conflict of interest that has not been disclosed to and approved by both
employers. Food Lion also claimed that ABC engaged in several deceptive trade practices
including collaborating with a union hostile to Food Lion, selectively editing footage and
actively lying and encouraging others to lie in the investigative report (Food Lion, Inc. 1998).
Unlike a libel lawsuit, this kind of suit did not ask jurors to assess the content of the investigative
report, only ABC’s newsgathering practices.
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Food Lion’s litigation and public relations campaign against ABC was launched at a time
when the company needed to divert attention from its own liability, as the Department of Labor
conducted its investigation and the company’s stock price plummeted after the ABC report.
During the jury trial, which did not conclude until 1996, Food Lion issued daily press releases
accessible by telephone and the Internet. Food Lion set up a hotel pressroom where journalists
could retrieve background information on Food Lion and view footage featured in the courtroom,
where journalists frequented daily. The supermarket chain also commissioned a journalism
professor to write an ethics case study critical of ABC (Folkerts 1998). The company mailed
this study, along with a companion booklet indicting ABC’s journalistic practices, to journalism
and law school professors across the United States for use in their classes (Richards and Calvert
2000: 566-568)
Nine months after the ABC report aired, Food Lion reached an agreement with the
Department of Labor to pay $13.2 million in back pay to tens of thousands of workers and
approximately $3 million in fines, comprising the largest settlement in the Department’s history.
The company also agreed to institute a self-monitoring plan to review its labor practices. Labor
Department officials found the supermarket chain had committed widespread violations,
including forced overtime, failing to pay employees for all hours worked, permitting minors to
work excessive hours on school days and to operate dangerous equipment, and firing or showing
bias toward employees who sought to protect their workplace rights (PR Newswire 1995).
The trial jury found ABC and all four producers guilty of fraud for falsifying employment
documents. It also found ABC producers Lynne Dale and Susan Barnett guilty of trespass for
gaining access to Food Lion property under false pretenses and breach of loyalty for collecting
hidden camera footage for ABC while on the clock for Food Lion. The jury ordered the network
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to pay $1,402 in compensatory damages for training fees spent on the two undercover producers
and their replacements. The jury awarded Food Lion an additional $5.5 million in punitive
damages for the deceptive trade practices used against it. Personal fines were assessed on former
PrimeTime Live Executive Producer Richard Kaplan and senior producer and head of the show’s
investigative team, Ira Rosen. Post-trial interviews indicated that jurors assessed the large
punitive award to deter ABC and others from using what the jurors saw as intrusive and
deceptive investigative methods, as a form of regulation of media conduct rather than as an
award to Food Lion for actual harm suffered. As one juror explained, “We were just really
trying to just send a message across: if you’re going to do it, just do it legally” (ABC News
1997b).
Appeals courts eventually threw out most of the damages and dismissed several of the
charges. In 1997, a judge lowered the punitive damages to $315,000 and reduced the fines
assessed upon Kaplan and Rosen, arguing that the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages
was extreme (Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956 M.D.N.C. 1997).
The $5.5 million fine was found extraordinary because Food Lion did not opt to sue for libel or
legally challenge the truth of the investigative report. Two years later, the Fourth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals further reduced damages to $1 for trespass and $1 for breach of loyalty. The
court found that Food Lion had attempted to skirt the higher burden of proof required in a libel
suit, attempting to circumvent First Amendment protections for the news media’s ability to
engage in robust and critical coverage of matters of public importance. Still, the appellate court’s
decision did not entirely exonerate ABC, upholding the charges of trespass and breach of loyalty
(Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 511, 4th Cir. 1999).
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Rationale for Case Studies
Because we were interested in the impact of corporate litigation public relations on media
coverage and reform, we chose cases that allowed us to minimize the impact of several other
variables: the historical period, the medium, the reporters’ dependence on others’ ongoing
investigations, the type of target, and the target response. Both cases involved television
network investigative reports that aired in 1992. Both stories were based on prior interest group
and regulatory probes of the targets. Both cases involved large corporate targets that fought back
against reports about them through lawsuits and public relations campaigns. In both cases, the
targets attempted to shift attention from the claims made against them by reporters to the
journalists’ newsgathering methods.
Our choice of cases permitted us to focus on the effects on media distraction of three key
variables: the news organization’s response to the counterattack, the scope of the target’s
counterclaims, and the length of the conflict. Whereas NBC settled with GM and apologized for
its report, ABC rejected and fought Food Lion’s charges. Whereas NBC apologized
immediately after GM protested publicly, just four months after the initial report, the ABC-Food
Lion struggle continued in the courts for seven years. Whereas GM alleged libel and faking a
product test, Food Lion levied many more legal charges against ABC’s newsgathering methods.
We explored each factor’s potential impact on the extent to which subsequent media coverage
was distracted from reporters’ initial allegations against corporate targets.
Research Questions
The cases allowed us to address several research questions.
1. To what extent does corporate litigation public relations distract subsequent media coverage
from investigative reporters’ claims about their targets?
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a. Are targets’ or their alleged victims’ viewpoints cited more often?
b. Are targets’ or their alleged victims’ viewpoints cited more prominently?
c. Are targets’ claims against reporters or reporters’ claims against targets cited more
often?
2. In what ways, if any, do targets’ counter-attacks against investigative reports hinder the
media’s ability to play watchdog on corporations?
3. What modifications do these case studies suggest for theories of investigative reporting’s
contribution to democracy?

Methods
To understand the effects of corporate targets on media coverage, the study employed a
content analysis of news coverage in three large-circulation, national newspapers: the New York
Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. These three newspapers were chosen
because of their power to shape broader media coverage through their wide dissemination via
wire services to local and smaller newspapers.
The sample consisted of all news stories found in the Lexis-Nexis database from January
1, 1992 to December 31, 1994 using the search term “General Motors and NBC,” and all news
stories from January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1999 using the search term “Food Lion and
ABC.” We restricted our search to articles that mentioned both the broadcast network and the
corporate target, rather than all stories about the target, because our research questions focused
on the impact on media coverage of the disputed network report and the target’s response. The
most reliable way to isolate the impact of these forces was to exclude articles that did not
mention both. Thus, we did not measure whether all coverage of GM trucks or Food Lion
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supermarkets was distracted from investigative reporters’ claims, but only coverage that
mentioned the investigative report and the target’s reaction to it. Not surprisingly, there was
some print coverage of the allegations against GM and Food Lion before each investigative
report aired, as well as stories on regulatory decisions involving both companies after the
investigative reports that did not mention the disputed reports.1
For each case, the specified time periods for the sample were chosen because they
encompassed coverage from the broadcast of the investigative report to the final regulatory and
judicial decisions related to each story. For the sake of comparing similar news items, opinion
articles (including columns, op-eds and editorials) were eliminated. The resulting sample
consisted of 69 articles – 41 GM-NBC articles and 28 Food Lion-ABC articles. For the GMNBC articles, 36.6% were from the New York Times, 26.8% were from the Washington Post, and
36.6% were from the Los Angeles Times. For Food Lion-ABC articles, 35.7% were from the
New York Times, 42.9% were from the Washington Post, and 21.4% were from the Los Angeles
Times.
Coders used two units of analysis to increase validity. Coding at the level of the sentence
offered a fine-grained analysis of how often sources and claims were mentioned in coverage.
However, this presents a danger that a handful of longer articles heavily weighted toward one
perspective can skew the results. Therefore, coders also coded at the level of the article by
summing the total sentences that mentioned competing sources and claims in each article, the
larger sum determining which view the article mentioned most. If the sums were equal, the
article was considered to have no primary viewpoint. Each of the two coders analyzed
approximately half of the articles for each case from each newspaper. The coders initially
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analyzed the same five randomly-chosen articles, or 7.25% of the sample, and measured
intercoder reliability, which averaged 0.89 for all categories using Holsti’s Test.
Target and Victim Perspectives
To determine whether target or victim sources appeared more often, coders recorded the
number of sentences that directly quoted or paraphrased targets and their advocates and victims
and their advocates. Targets and their advocates included GM and Food Lion, as well as the
companies’ lawyers and public relations specialists. Victims and their advocates included the
Victims Committee to Recall GM Pickups, lawyers representing families of GM victims, the
Department of Transportation, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Consumers
United with Employees, Food Lion employees and the Department of Labor. Coders recorded
advocates’ perspectives only when they spoke in support of the targets’ or victims’ views.
Coders also measured prominence of victims’ and targets’ viewpoints. Using the
inverted pyramid method of news writing, journalists generally present what they consider to be
the most important information in the article’s “lead.” Headlines also offer a summary of the
article’s central information. Thus, to measure prominence, coders recorded the number of
sentences that presented each perspective in the headline and first three paragraphs combined.
Distraction
To determine the extent that targets distracted media coverage from the original
allegations made by investigative reports, the study coded the number of sentences that
mentioned investigative reporters’ claims and targets’ counterclaims. Counterclaims included
attacks on newsgathering methods, such as GM’s claims that Dateline NBC staged and
misrepresented the crash test and Food Lion’s claims that ABC’s PrimeTime Live producers
committed fraud, trespass and breach of loyalty. They also included rebuttals of the truth of the
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investigative report. Examples of rebuttals were GM’s claims of producing safe vehicles and
Food Lion’s claims of maintaining safe food handling practices and not forcing its employees to
work overtime.
Distraction and non-distraction variables were then created to provide a measure of the
extent that corporate targets diverted media attention from reporters’ criticisms. The distraction
variable included claims pertaining to newsgathering methods, whether critical or supportive of
these methods, because these kinds of claims shift attention away from allegations about targets
in investigative reports. The non-distraction variable included claims made by the investigative
report and rebuttals to these claims, as both direct attention to the substance of the investigative
report.
To minimize variations within each case, we ran paired-samples t tests on each of the two
cases separately because of potential difference within the cases. This type of test was chosen
because it compares two means from coding categories that are not mutually exclusive. We used
a chi-square test for goodness of fit to determine if there was a significant difference between
articles that featured targets’ or victims’ views in our sample. The chi-square test was chosen
because it is used to assess data that are divided into distinct categories. It assumes that the
prevalence of all categories should be the same and tests to see if divergence from the ideal
distribution is significant.
Findings
Distraction
Corporate targets were quoted or paraphrased more often than victims in both cases (see
Table 1). In the GM-NBC case, GM’s point of view appeared over twice as often as victims’ in
both sentences (t(40) = 3.457, p < 0.001) and articles (2(1, n = 40) = 6.400, p < 0.05). In the
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Food Lion-ABC case, Food Lion’s perspective appeared more than three times as often as
victims’ in both sentences (t(27) = 3.938, p < 0.001) and articles (2 (1, n = 27) = 10.704, p =
0.001).
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
In both cases, the number of sentences that presented targets’ perspectives prominently in
the articles’ headlines and leads combined was about twice that of sentences presenting victims’
points of view. However, these differences were not statistically significant because of the
scarcity of data points. Of all 69 articles coded, only 47.8% quoted or paraphrased either
perspective in the headline and lead. Of these articles, most quoted or paraphrased only one or
two points of view at the start of the article.
Newspaper coverage was distracted from the original accusations made in the
investigative reports less often in the GM-NBC case than in the Food Lion-ABC case (see Table
2). In the stories about GM-NBC, an almost equal number of sentences diverted focus to NBC’s
newsgathering methods as focused on the charges made against GM in the investigative report
and rebuttals to them (t(40) = 0.26, p > 0.05). However, because a large number of nondistraction sentences appeared in a few longer articles, more articles were coded as distracting
than non-distracting, although this difference was not statistically significant (2 (1, n = 40) =
3.60, p <0.10). Thus, GM managed to divert a substantial amount of subsequent media coverage
from NBC’s claims against them, despite jury verdicts and regulatory findings that the
company’s trucks posed a significant danger to their owners. Food Lion was even more
successful at diverting coverage from ABC’s allegations and focusing it on newsgathering
methods. More than twice as many sentences distracted from the ABC story’s claims as reported
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them (t(27) = 2.958, p < 0.01), and twice as many articles did so as well (2 (1, n = 27) = 4.480,
p< 0.05).
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
Three major factors influenced the extent to which targets turned media attention away
from investigative reporters’ charges toward their newsgathering methods. First, the scope of the
target’s counter-claims shaped the level of media distraction. Food Lion was more successful at
diverting attention in part because the company made many more kinds of legal charges against
ABC’s newsgathering methods than GM did against NBC’s. Therefore, news coverage devoted
greater space to explaining Food Lion’s claims. Second, the length of the conflict appeared to
influence media distraction. In the Food Lion-ABC case, there were four different court rulings,
from pre-trial through appeals, over the seven year life of the lawsuit, each providing additional
news pegs for the rest of the media. By the end of the case, ABC’s charges against the grocery
chain were all but forgotten by the press amidst the First Amendment issues raised by the
lawsuit. By contrast, the GM case was settled in a matter of months after the report aired, before
legal papers were even served on NBC. There was less media distraction here even though NBC
called its own newsgathering methods unethical and apologized for the report’s claims against
GM. This suggests that the longer the controversy, the greater is the likelihood of media
diversion from the substance of the original story, regardless of whether investigative reporters’
own news organizations admit mistakes or stick by their story. Third, the nature of the news
organization’s response obviously had an impact, but a counter-intuitive one. Although NBC
quickly retracted its story, media coverage of the dispute was less distracted from the claims
against GM’s trucks than it was from ABC’s charges against Food Lion, which ABC defended.
This implies a paradox: the more that a news organization fights back against targets’ attacks on
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newsgathering methods, the more likely it is to distract media attention from its own
investigative reporters’ findings.
Another set of factors may external to the reporter-target relationship, which we did not
initially consider, appeared to have some impact as well. The response by victims and their
advocates exerted some influence on subsequent coverage as well. One reason that reporting on
the GM-NBC affair maintained greater focus on the problems with GM’s trucks is that consumer
safety groups continued to petition government to recall the vehicles, helping to keep the story
alive. Although the United Food and Commercial Workers Union brought a successful
complaint to the Department of Labor about Food Lion’s overtime practices, no comparable
interest group engaged government food safety inspectors to penalize the supermarket chain.
Regulatory response offers another external factor that can shape media coverage. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration officials spent 18 months reviewing the safety of the GM
trucks during the period of media coverage studied here, helping to prolong coverage of their
dangers. Although the Department of Labor found Food Lion violated fair labor practices, it did
so with less fanfare and more quickly after the ABC report aired, minimizing regulators’
contribution to keeping the story in the public eye.
Impact of Litigation Public Relations on Watchdog Role
These cases and the coverage of the controversies they sparked suggest several
conclusions about how corporate counterspeech can shape media coverage in ways that limit
investigative reporters’ ability to act as watchdogs on powerful companies. Both NBC and ABC
revealed significant threats to public wellbeing posed by large corporations. Yet media response
helped weaken the networks’ ability to fulfill their watchdog role by turning journalists’ attention
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overwhelmingly toward issues of journalism ethics, privileging corporate target sources, and
ironically, by focusing on the First Amendment rights of investigative reporters.
Most journalists and scholars probably recall NBC’s efforts as less successful
watchdogging because its reporters left themselves open to charges of staging the crash test
shown in their report. Yet this impression may well have been a public relations triumph for
GM. It was not entirely clear that NBC’s use of incendiary devices caused a “rigged” explosion
shown in the report. Nor did GM’s libel suit offer a strong chance of victory in court, although it
could have punished NBC by forcing the network to ring up large legal fees to defend its
journalists. To prevail in court, GM would have to have proved not only that NBC reporters
knew their report was staged, but that it conveyed a falsehood about trucks that a jury had
previously found to be dangerous (later confirmed by the Transportation Department), and that
the report damaged GM’s reputation independent of other publicity inspired by the many
lawsuits against the company (Goodale 1993a). Instead, GM prevailed through the news media
itself, diverting journalistic attention from the question of its trucks’ safety to questions about
NBC’s news ethics. The case indicates that corporate targets’ responses can curb investigative
reporters’ and the rest of the media’s ability to hold targets publicly accountable when they
exploit vulnerable media practices and owners’ concerns about the potential costs of lawsuits.
By contrast, the Food Lion-ABC case suggests different limits to the watchdog role. ABC
refused to disavow its journalists’ claims against Food Lion and fought a lawsuit that many
journalists felt cast a chill over investigative reporting on corporations in general. For example,
the Fox News Director who tamed a critical 1997 report on Monsanto’s bovine growth hormone
explained that “A lot of people now are more fearful of doing investigative journalism since
Food Lion . . . which is why we have so many lawyers involved” (Stauber and Rampton 1998).
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But ABC’s extended First Amendment defense ironically helped shift media attention from its
original report. ABC’s own follow-up coverage did so as well. Subsequent reports on
Primetime Live and ABC’s Nightline both followed the jury verdict in Food Lion’s case against
the network, rather than advancing the story by reporting on the Department of Labor’s findings
against the company, attempts to unionize its workers, or the lack of scrutiny by food safety
inspectors (ABC News 1997a; ABC News 1997b).
It may be argued that the elite newspapers sampled here performed a public service by
playing watchdog on NBC’s and ABC’s newsgathering practices. But this came at the cost of
holding GM and Food Lion accountable to public scrutiny, by helping both companies turn the
spotlight on their accusers rather than the charges against them. Thus, the more the media act as
watchdogs on each other’s newsgathering methods, the less they may be able to act as protectors
of the public against other corporate abuses of power.
The print media studied here also offered an uneven marketplace of ideas that
marginalized voices critical of Food Lion and GM from subsequent coverage. In both cases, print
reporting cited targets’ views far more frequently than victims’ views. In the GM-NBC case,
coverage balanced discussion of the claims against GM’s trucks with charges against NBC’s
newsgathering methods. GM sources, however, still had the opportunity to speak twice as often
as victims. The Food Lion case especially raises concerns about corporate public relations
allowing companies to monopolize the marketplace of ideas. Food Lion and its advocates, cited
approximately three times as often as victims, clearly dominated the media agenda subsequent to
the investigative report. More than twice as much of this coverage focused on newsgathering
issues than on charges about the supermarket chain’s food handling and treatment of labor.
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Nonetheless, neither corporate target’s counter-attack succeeded in staving off regulatory
and judicial action against it. On the contrary, Food Lion and GM entered into multimillion
dollar settlements with federal agencies, and GM ended up paying hundreds of millions of
dollars to plaintiffs in truck lawsuits. Thus, while target-driven media coverage may undermine
investigative reporting’s credibility and vigor in the eyes of other journalists, it does not
necessarily sap regulators’ willingness to sanction corporate offenders. In both cases, ongoing
government investigations supported by organized interest groups came to fruition regardless of
the challenges to the reports and the ensuing media distraction. Although these investigative
reports emerged from the work of others in the policy process, the corporate attacks on them and
subsequent media coverage seemed to have no impact on what was happening in federal
agencies.

The Mobilization Model Revisited
These findings suggest a number of revisions of the mobilization model (see Figure 2).
The cases bolster prior research that reveals that investigative reporters rarely work
independently to create reports or spark reforms. Prior action by interest groups and government
agencies informed both reports and was largely responsible for enacting what reforms occurred
as NBC and ABC struggled with their targets’ counter-attacks. This is a two-way relationship in
which interest groups and government may draw on investigative reports to advance their
agendas as well. Public opinion was a factor in the Food Lion case, as the ABC report drove
down its stock considerably, increasing pressure on the company to settle labor violations
charges.
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
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Regardless of the outcomes in these cases, attempts to understand what shapes
investigative reporting’s impact on policy should devote greater attention to media response and
the factors that influence it, especially target responses such as corporate litigation and public
relations counter-offensives. Protess and his colleagues found that media investigations do not
always lead to changes in public opinion or public policy in part because of the lack of follow up
stories by investigative reporters (1991: 19-20). Our findings of widespread media distraction
suggest that corporate counter-attacks can shift media attention from following up on claims
against targets, reframing investigative stories into journalism ethics and First Amendment
stories. Targets can seize on these opportunities to divert media attention from victims’ claims,
potentially limiting the reports’ influence on public opinion and policy makers. This is most
likely to occur when targets issue a greater number of counterclaims, when the conflict is
prolonged, and, curiously enough, when the news organization fights back by asserting its First
Amendment rights rather than issuing a retraction or apology for the disputed story.
Of course, victims’ advocates are not powerless to respond, as the Center for Auto Safety
and United Food and Commercial Workers Union showed by maintaining pressure for change
despite corporate attempts to discredit reports. Regulators such as the Department of
Transportation and Department of Labor can influence follow-up coverage through issuing new
findings and rulings, although they did so only minimally in these cases as media focus had
turned to issues of newsgathering ethics and journalistic free speech.

Conclusion
This study has suggested additional factors that influence the policy impact of watchdog
journalism, many of them focused on managing subsequent media response. We found that
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corporate targets that issue a hail of counterclaims are more likely to distract the media than
targets who raise fewer criticisms. It appeared that the more news organizations under attack
defend their right to muckrake in general, the more they risk burying the disputed story under
discussions of First Amendment rights and media ethics, sacrificing their ability to hold specific
corporate targets accountable. The elite print media can assist targets in turning the tables and
playing watchdog on investigative journalists by providing targets with a forum for criticizing
journalists and diverting public attention. Print attention to investigative reporters’ shortcomings
comes at the expense of additional scrutiny of corporate targets. The print response studied here
did not offer much diversity of viewpoint on these controversies, slighting the views of victims
and their representatives.
The limits to our ability to generalize from these case studies suggest avenues for future
research. While we chose to focus on reaction to television reports, responses to controversial
investigative journalism in newspapers and online journalism might differ. Studies could
compare reactions to local and national investigative reports. Local media’s greater economic
dependence on local corporations as advertisers may make these news organizations more likely
to feature their criticisms of investigative reports. However, the presence of less competition in
many local news markets may make these organizations less accountable to outside forces in
some instances.
Likewise, whereas we sampled national newspapers, studies of media reception of
investigative reports could explore response in the local press. Local papers in areas that depend
heavily on the corporate target as a source of employment may be more solicitous of the
corporation’s views, while media in other regions might feature victims’ views more in an effort
to provide a local angle. In addition, future studies might test whether media competition
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influences coverage. Television news response, which we did not study, may have been more
sympathetic to NBC and ABC in these cases because journalists were more likely to use similar
newsgathering techniques (especially hidden cameras) and therefore feel more threatened by GM
and Food Lion’s lawsuits. Or television journalists may have been harder on NBC and ABC as
their chief competitors.
Future research on the effects of litigation public relations could study the impacts of a
broader variety of targets on media coverage. Smaller businesses with fewer resources are not
likely to be as successful in diverting coverage from investigative reporters’ claims or posing
costly legal threats. Public opinion and dependence on the news media to communicate with the
public (as well as libel law in the U.S.) place greater constraints on government targets’ ability to
bring lawsuits and sustained public relations campaigns against the press. At the same time,
government sources enjoy powerful access as preferred news sources. Their ability to distract
media coverage is likely affected by a wider range of policy actors, especially opposing parties
and candidates.
Finally, comparative national and historical analysis would be desirable. Complaints
about newsgathering methods came to the fore in the U.S. in the 1990s in part as a way for critics
of news to avoid the formidable task of proving libel under American law, and in the absence of
the Federal Communications Commission as a venue for dispute resolution (through adjudication
of complaints brought under the now-defunct fairness doctrine, for example.) Examining cases
across a broader historical period would help shed light on whether media response is more or
less influential on investigative reporting’s impact on policy in the contemporary regulatory
environment than in the past, and whether it is easier or harder for corporate targets to distract
the media today. Similarly, comparative analysis across different legal and political regimes
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would illuminate how they structure the kinds of responses chosen by the targets of investigative
reporting and how successful they are at diverting attention to issues of journalism ethics.
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FIGURE 1
The Mobilization Model of Investigative Reporting
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TABLE 1
Target and Victim Perspectives in Coverage
Sentences

Articles

Headlines and Leads

Target

Victim

Target

Victim

Target

Victim

GM - NBC

188

89

28

12

42

22

Food Lion - ABC

131

43

22

5

17

8

Note: 2 articles in which target and victim perspectives were equally represented, one from each
case study, are omitted above from the article count.

TABLE 2
Distraction and Nondistraction in Coverage
Sentences
Distraction

Articles

Nondistraction

Distraction

Nondistraction

GM - NBC

368

370

26

14

Food Lion - ABC

359

158

19

8

Note: 2 articles in which distraction and nondistraction sentences were equally represented, one
from each case study, are omitted above from the article count.

29

Figure 2
The Revised Mobilization Model of Investigative Reporting
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Notes
1

To determine how much our sample accounted for all coverage of the allegations against the
two targets, whether made by the investigative reporters or by others, we conducted broader
searches on “Food Lion and employees” and “General Motors and suit* or transportation” (for
truck safety lawsuits or the Department of Transportation probe). We then focused the searches
by adding the terms ABC and NBC respectively. The differences in hits between the two
searches indicated that our sample ranged from about thirty-five to seventy percent of all
coverage of these allegations, depending on the newspaper.
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